Today, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, the United States Supreme Court affirmed Florida Supreme Court's opinion upholding the Florida Bar's ban on judicial candidates soliciting campaign contribution. The opinion is broken into numerous parts, as described by the Court below:
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, except as to Part II. BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
joined that opinion in full, and GINSBURG, J., joined except as to Part II.
BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BREYER, J., joined
as to Part II. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J.,
joined. KENNEDY, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
The majority opinion began as follows:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the
opinion of the Court, except as to Part II.
Our Founders vested authority to
appoint federal judges in the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and entrusted those judges to hold their offices during good behavior.
The Constitution permits States to make a different choice, and most of them
have done so. In 39 States, voters elect trial or appellate judges at the
polls. In an effort to preserve public confidence in the integrity of their
judiciaries, many of those States prohibit judges and judicial candidates from
personally soliciting funds for their campaigns. We must decide whether the
First Amendment permits such restrictions on speech.
We hold that it does. Judges are not
politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a
State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial
candidates like campaigners for political office. A State may assure its people
that judges will apply the law without fear or favor—and without having
personally asked anyone for money. We affirm the judgment of the Florida
Supreme Court.
And, the majority opinion concluded:
The desirability of judicial
elections is a question that has sparked disagreement for more than 200 years.
Hamilton believed that appointing judges to positions with life tenure
constituted “the best expedient which can be devised in any government to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.” The
Federalist No. 78, at 465. Jefferson thought that making judges “dependent on
none but themselves” ran counter to the principle of “a government founded on
the public will.” 12 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 5 (P. Ford ed. 1905). The
federal courts reflect the view of Hamilton; most States have sided with
Jefferson. Both methods have given our Nation jurists of wisdom and rectitude
who have devoted themselves to maintaining “the public’s respect . . . and a
reserve of public goodwill, without becoming subservient to public opinion.”
Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 579, 596 (2004).
It is not our place to resolve this
enduring debate. Our limited task is to apply the Constitution to the question
presented in this case. Judicial candidates have a First Amendment right to
speak in support of their campaigns. States have a compelling interest in
preserving public confidence in their judiciaries. When the State adopts a
narrowly tailored restriction like the one at issue here, those principles do
not conflict. A State’s decision to elect judges does not compel it to
compromise public confidence in their integrity.
The judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court is Affirmed.