Oral Ruling Cannot Be Appealed

In Lawton v. Sorrells (1D09-4016), the First District dismissed an appeal because "without a signed written order there is nothing to appeal, and therefore, an oral pronouncement cannot be appealed."

Order Staying Action Pending Disposition Of Another Action Is Not A Reviewable Non-Final Order

In Pecora v. Signature Gardens, Ltd., et al (4D09-1192), the Fourth District concluded:  "An order abating or staying an action pending disposition of another action is not a reviewable non-final order."

Dismissal Of Compulsory Couterclaim Not Appealable Until Original Action Finally Disposed

In The Haven Center, Inc. v. Meruelo (3D09-407), the Third District reversed an appeal of an order granting summary judgment of compulsory counterclaims that included the words of finality because the appellee's original and related action remained pending.  The summary judgment was not reversed and the decision was without prejudice to appeal the granting of the summary judgment after the adjudication of the counterclaims. The court stated:

The adjudication of compulsory counterclaims such as these is “not appealable until a final disposition of the original cause has obtained on the merits.”...Meruelo nevertheless encouraged the trial court to add the words of finality, that Haven Center “take nothing on its counterclaim and go hence without day,” over Haven Center’s objection. We reverse the judgment because it is not, in fact, a final judgment, but we do so without prejudice to the right of the parties to appeal when both the claims and the counterclaims have been fully adjudicated.

Two Appeals Dismissed Sua Sponte - Order Below Never "Rendered"

In two cases on Friday, U.S. Bank National Association v. Bjeljac (5D09-2809)  and  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lupica (5D09-2902), the Fifth District sua sponte dismissed appeals for lack of jurisdiction.  In both, the court noted that the order being appealed was never actually rendered by the trial court.  "To invoke the jurisdiction of an appellate court, the order for which review is sought must be rendered by the lower court. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). An order is rendered when it is reduced to writing, signed and filed with the clerk of the trial court. Fla. R. App. P.  9.020(h). A rubber-stamped order on a document that has already been filed is, at best, confusing. When the document does not receive a second date stamp from the clerk, there is nothing on the face of the appellate record to establish that the order was ever rendered." [The quoted language appears in both decisions, however, this was cut from the Wells Fargo decision.]

Also in both decisions, the court stated:

We also have concerns about the summary disposition of U.S. Bank’s motions. We are mindful of the significant workload faced by Florida’s trial judges, particularly with the flood of foreclosures inundating the court system and the staff reductions necessitated by budget shortfalls. Nonetheless, for an appellate court to provide meaningful review of a trial court order, particularly when the trial court possesses significant discretion, some indication of the reasons underlying the trial court’s ruling is helpful. “It is not the function of an appellate court to cull the underlying record in an effort to locate findings and underlying reasons which would support the order.” Jacques v. Jacques, 609 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Here, the trial court’s “denied” stamp does not help us determine if the trial judge abused his discretion or not. Some basis for the ruling would be instructive both to the parties and this Court.

Order Is Not Rendered Until Filed With The Clerk

In SIEGERS SEED COMPANY v. WILLIAMS FARM PARTNERSHIP (1D08-3920), the First District dismissed a petition for certiorari because the order had not yet been rendered and is, therefore, not appealable. The court stated:

The parties do not dispute that neither the Commissioner’s letter nor the Council’s recommendation was filed with the agency clerk. An agency does not render a final order until it is filed with the agency clerk. See Hill v. Div. of Ret., 687 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Gallo v. Florida Comm’n on Human Relations, 867 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); See also Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)("An order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal."). An order must be rendered in order to invoke appellate jurisdiction, United Water Fla., Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 728 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and to invoke this court’s original jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c) (providing that a petition for certiorari must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed).

Sua Sponte Dismissal of Appeal of Order That Was Neither Final Nor An Appealable Non-Final Order

In Rust v. Brown (4D08-2584), the Fourth District sua sponte dismissed an appeal because the order being reviewed was "neither a final nor an appealable, non-final order."

"An order merely granting a motion for summary judgment is not a final order because it does not enter judgment for or against a party. White Palms of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Fox, 525 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Dobrick v. Discovery Cruises, Inc., 581 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Here, the order in essence sustained the surviving spouse’s objection to the personal representative’s apportionment plan. It is neither a final nor an appealable, non-final order. We must therefore dismiss the appeal."

First District Dismisses Premature Appeal

In Pauls v. Blank (1D09-1232), the First District dismissed the appeal as premature. The Court held that "the order on appeal is not an appealable order because there is a 'factual overlap between the claim resolved by the order and a pending claim'."

Rule 1.540 Does Not Apply to Non-Final Order

In Hollifield v. Renew & Co., Inc. (1D08-3677), the First DCA held the trial court improperly entered an order in an attempt to remedy counsel's admitted error in failing to file a notice of appeal. The court distinguished the error by counsel from "Pompi v. City of Jacksonville, 872 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), whose holding applies to cases where the court or court staff substantially contributed to counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal."

"We grant the petition because the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in utilizing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 to allow an otherwise untimely notice of appeal.

***

As an alternative ground for issuance of the writ, our review discloses that Rule 1.540(b), under which the trial court granted relief, does not authorize relief from the type of order involved in this case. Rule 1.540 authorizes a trial court to grant relief "from a final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding" – not from a non-final order such as that at issue here. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)."

Fourth District Holds You Do Not Waive Right to Appeal After Judgment by Not Filing Interlocutory Appeal

In United Automobile Insurance Company v. Buchalter (4D09-566), on second-tier certiorari review, the Fourth District reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the appellants appeal.

The circuit court dismissed because it believed United had failed to appeal the order as an interlocutory appeal.

The Fourth DCA stated: "Second-tier certiorari will lie in this Court from final determinations by the circuit court made in its appellate capacity. The petitioner must demonstrate that the circuit court failed to afford procedural due process or failed to apply the correct law (the equivalent of a departure from the essential requirements of law)."

"As UAIC observes, there is no authority for a non-final appeal from an order striking a defendant’s pleadings and entering a default, even under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C), since the rule was amended in 2000 resulting in removal of the provision for appeals of orders determining liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief...Further, even if the order was appealable as an interlocutory appeal, petitioner still had the right to wait to appeal the order after final judgment in a plenary appeal."

Motion for Rehearing Can Toll the Finality of an Order

In Schinstine v. Schinstine (1D09-1203), the First District wrote a short citation opinion and noted by parenthetical that a motion for rehearing can preclude a final order from being final.

Appeal Premature Where Jurisdiction to Determine Entitlement and Amount of Attorneys Fees Merely Reserved

In Freemon v. Velez (4D08-2585), the Fourth District held the appeal was premature, stating:

Because the final judgment merely reserved jurisdiction to determine entitlement to and the amount of attorney’s fees, appeal of this issue was premature. Although appellant explains that the trial court made that determination after the filing of the notice of appeal, “[t]his court cannot review judicial acts of a trial court taking place after the filing of a notice of appeal unless those judicial acts are themselves made the subject of a new notice of appeal or other appropriate appellate proceedings.”

Another Decision Based Upon Lack of Finality of Order Under Review

In City of Marco Island v. Dumas (2D09-532), the Second DCA reviewed a decision of the county court, which was first reviewed by the circuit court.

The county court entered an order that the city correctly did not believe final (even though the county court judge believed it to be final). Therefore, the City moved and the county court judge entered a second order. The City timely appealed the second order. The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal and argued the first order was the appealable order. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the appeal. The circuit court believed it was a final order that "left no judicial labor to be done "except the execution of the judgment."

It relied on McGurn v. Scott, 596 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1992), and Rollins Fruit Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 923 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In McGurn, the trial court entered an order entitled "final judgment" that reserved the right to award prejudgment interest. As the court stated: "Therefore, the issue before this Court is whether a trial court may issue a final appealable order while reserving jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest." 596 So. 2d at 1043. The court then explained: "It is well settled that a judgment attains the degree of finality necessary to support an appeal when it adjudicates the merits of the cause and disposes of the action between the parties, leaving no judicial labor to be done except the execution of the judgment." Id. Obviously, what the circuit court overlooked in this case is the fact that the October order did not expressly adjudicate the merits of the enforcement proceeding or dispose of the action; it merely entered a legal ruling as to an issue in the case. It is comparable to the order granting a motion to dismiss that this court held to be nonfinal in Rollins Fruit, 923 So. 2d 516, which is the other case that the circuit court cited in support of its order of dismissal. It is also comparable to an order granting summary judgment, which is not appealable. See Cardiothoracic & Vascular Surgery, P.A. v. W. Fla. Reg'l, 993 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The order entered in October was a nonfinal, nonappealable order. The City properly requested the county court to enter a final appealable order based on the reasoning of that order and it has filed a timely appeal from that order. Petition for writ of mandamus granted with instructions to reinstate appeal from county court.

Words of Finality Required for Appellate Court to Have Jurisdiction (Again)

In Downrite Engineering Corporation v. Overland Carriers, Inc. (3D09-876) the Third DCA dismissed the appeal because the trial court had not yet entered judgment with the traditional words of finality. The court held: "the law is settled that an order which merely grants a motion for summary judgment and does not otherwise contain the traditional words of finality is not a final order subject to appellate review."

Judgment as to Liability Only is Not a Final Order

Today, in Singleton v. Realty Land Investments Inc. (08-86069), the First DCA dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and held that a final judgment as to liability but reserving jurisdiction as to damages is not a final appealable order.

because the instant order does not bring an end to the litigation below, this order is not final. See Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371, 375 (Fla. 2002) (reaffirming traditional test of finality that a "final judgment is one which ends the litigation between the parties and disposes of all issues involved such that no further action by the court will be necessary."); Hernando County v. Leisure Hills, Inc., 648 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that issue of damages is so intertwined with substance of a claim as to render an order reserving jurisdiction to determine damages nonfinal).