Magistrate Judge Must Enter Written Order - Trial Court Cannot Review Oral Ruling

In City of Key West Tree Commission v. Havlicek (3D09-1595), the Third District reversed the trial court's review of a oral ruling by a magistrate judge because "The Magistrate should enter a written order, and without it, the circuit court has no jurisdiction."

Third District Summarily Reverses Trial Court Order Overturning Magistrate Report

In Barker v. Crawford (3D08-2251), the Third District summarily reversed a trial court order rejecting a report from a magistrate. The court concluded: "We conclude the general master’s analysis is the legally correct one. See Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1996); Smith v. Smith, 919 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)."

Hearing Must be Held on Timely Filed Objections to Magistrate Report

In Hilb Rogal & Hobbs of Florida, Inc. v. Grimmel (4D09-1314), the Fourth District reversed the entry of judgment based upon the trial court's failure to conduct a hearing on timely filed objections to a magistrates report.

Reversal for Failure to Grant Continuance and for Failure to Consider Objection to Magistrate's Recommendation

In Riley v. Riley (2D08-62), the Second District reversed the final judgment below for failure to grant a motion for continuance prior to the final hearing and for the trial court's failure to hear a timely filed objection to the magistrates recommendation.

Although a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for continuance, that discretion is not absolute. Neal v. Swaby, 975 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The appellate court considers the following factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on a motion for continuance: "1) whether the movant suffers injustice from the denial of the motion; 2) whether the underlying cause for the motion was unforeseen by the movant and whether the motion is based on dilatory tactics; and 3) whether prejudice and injustice will befall the opposing party if the motion is granted." Id. (quoting Baron v. Baron, 941 So. 2d 1233, 1235-36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)).

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A trial court must hear timely filed exceptions to a magistrate's report. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(f); Betz v. Betz, 790 So. 2d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Rule 12.490(f) provides, "The parties may serve exceptions to the report within 10 days from the time it is served on them." Pursuant to rule 12.090 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(e), the Husband had an additional five days to serve his exceptions because the magistrate's report was served on him by mail. See Werntz v. Floyd, 814 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Palmer v. Palmer, 582 So. 2d 639, 640 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). In fact, the Wife cites Werntz in her answer brief and recognizes that the Husband was allowed the additional five days to serve his exceptions. The time to serve the exceptions began to run on April 24, 2007, the day after the earliest date the report could have been served on the Husband. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090(a); Palmer, 582 So. 2d at 639-40. The Husband timely served his exceptions on May 8, 2007, the fifteenth day after April 23, 2007. Thus, the trial court should have considered the Husband's exceptions before it entered the final judgment. See Betz, 790 So. 2d at 1130.

General Magistrate Cannot Conduct Jury Trial in Florida

In Lackner v. Central Fla. Investments, Inc. (5D07-3542), the Fifth District vacated its prior decision and determined that a General Magistrate does not have jurisdiction to conduct a jury trial even with consent of both parties.

The docket for the case indicates that on April 9, 2009, the court entered an opinion. Apparently on the same day, the court entered an order sua sponte withdrawing the prior opinion and requiring the parties to brief the following issue: "ADDRESSING THE AUTHORITY OF A MAGISTRATE TO CONVENE AND PRESIDE OVER A JURY TRIAL."

The court stated:

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.490 authorizes judges of the circuit court to appoint general and special magistrates. General magistrates continue in office until removed by the court and must take the oath of office required of officers by the Constitution. No matter can be referred to a magistrate without the parties' consent. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.490(a)-(c) (2009). A magistrate's general powers and duties are defined in subsection (d), which states in relevant part: "Every magistrate shall perform all of the duties that pertain to the office according to the practice in chancery and under the direction of the court." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.490(d). Focusing on the word "all," the Appellant Lackner asserts that this provision should be interpreted to permit a magistrate to perform all functions of the trial court, including presiding over jury trials. This argument ignores the last part of the sentence, which limits a magistrate to those duties "that pertain to the office according to the practice in chancery and under the direction of the court." Id. The first part of this phrase seems to confine a magistrate to those duties traditionally exercised by magistrates in chancery, which largely consisted of taking witness testimony. The second part of the phrase clearly specifies that a magistrate's duties must be performed under the direction of the court. These two limitations weigh against interpreting the rule to permit a magistrate to preside over a jury trial, especially when considered in the context of the rest of rule 1.490.

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Article V of the Florida Constitution vests judicial power exclusively in the courts. The authority to conduct jury trials is implicit in the judicial power, and the Legislature has made it explicit by statute. Section 40.001, Florida Statutes (2008), provides in relevant part: "The chief judge of each judicial circuit is vested with overall authority and responsibility for the management, operation, and oversight of the jury system within his or her circuit." Judicial powers vested in the courts by constitution or statute are nondelegable.

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The problem in the present case is compounded by the fact that the magistrate did not issue a report or recommendation. Instead, he purported to render a final judgment in favor of Central Florida Investments...There is nothing in the record to suggest that this "final judgment" was ever adopted, ratified, or otherwise approved by the trial court. In other words, no appealable final order was ever rendered by the trial court; therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the issues presented on appeal.

Consent Required for Special Magistrate

On March 25, 2009, the Third District released an opinion in the case of GIELCHINSKY V. VIBO CORP (08-2614). The court held a party can withdraw its consent to the use of a special magistrate at any time:

Consent of the parties is required to refer any matter to a special magistrate. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.490(c). See also Pesut v. Miller, 773 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Miller v. Lifshutz, 558 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Concomitantly, if a party withdraws his consent, as Gielchinsky did here with good cause due to financial reasons, then it logically follows that the matter is no longer appropriate for a special magistrate.