In Bunin v. Matrix Initiatives, Inc. (4D14-3579), the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's retroactive application of the Florida Legislature's 2013 adoption of the federal Daubert standard for the admission of expert testimony. The court stated:
An order on a motion to exclude expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Booker v. Sumter Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 166 So. 3d 189, 194 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). But the issue of whether a statute applies retroactively is a question of law reviewed de novo. Bionetics Corp. v.Kenniasty, 69 So. 3d 943, 947 (Fla. 2011).
In 2013, the Florida Legislature amended section 90.702 with the intent to adopt the federal Daubert standard for the admission of expert testimony. See Ch. 2013–107, § 1, Laws of Fla. (2013). On appeal, the plaintiff’s primary argument is that the 2013 amendments to section 90.702 are substantive in nature and should not be applied retroactively to her case, which was filed in 2009. We disagree.
It is well-settled that “[p]rocedural or remedial statutes . . . are to be applied retrospectively and are to be applied to pending cases.” AlamoRent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994). A statute that merely “relates to the admission of evidence” is generally considered procedural. Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 439 (Fla. 1995). Accordingly, as the Third District has explained, “section 90.702 of the Florida Evidence Code indisputably applies retrospectively.” Perez v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 498 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2014).1
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s expert’s causation opinion under Daubert, even though the expert’s opinion would have been admissible under the “pure opinion” rule of Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 548–50 (Fla. 2007). Because the plaintiff’s case depended upon her expert’s excluded causation testimony, the summary judgment in favor of the defendants must stand.
1 In deciding that the amendments apply retrospectively, we note that the plaintiff did not raise the argument that the 2013 amendments to section 90.702 violated the separation of powers doctrine by encroaching upon the Florida Supreme Court’s authority to adopt procedural rules in Florida courts. See Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.
The court also reversed a cost judgment because it included costs that were not in the "'should be' or 'may be' taxed under the Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions, and the trial court failed to make any specific findings in the cost judgment as to the unique and extraordinary circumstances that would justify a deviation from the guidelines."