Funds Not Property Of ERISA Plan Until Remitted To Plan

In Pantoja v. Zengel (12-11036), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment that the money at issue was not an asset of the ERISA plan where the money had never been given to the ERISA plan. The court held:

Upon examination of the Plan documents, we find no clear and specific language indicating the fringe benefits are “plan assets” before they are actually remitted to the Plan. Indeed, unlike the plan documents in ITPE Pension Fund, this contract is not even susceptible to such a reading. See 334 F.3d at 1016. Without clear language or any evidence indicating otherwise, we conclude that the unpaid funds cannot be construed as plan assets; therefore, the Appellees did not breach a fiduciary duty as a matter of law.

Fourth District On Invited Error And Jurisdiction To Review Rehearing Orders

In Rodrigo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (4D10-1787), the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's decision in part and dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction.  The court stated that "Appellant appeals a non-final order granting her motion to restore possession of her home but with the condition that she turn on the water and air conditioning to her unit."

First, the trial court's order was affirmed because "During the hearing on appellant’s motion to restore  possession of  property,  appellant’s counsel  agreed  to these conditions.  Having invited the alleged error, appellant cannot now be heard  to complain."  Therefore, the order was affirmed. 

The Appellant also sought review of an order on a motion for rehearing of the order, now affirmed, above.  The court stated: "A non-final order denying a motion for relief from a non-final order is not reviewable on appeal....Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as to the order denying the motion for relief."

The opinion is below:
Rodrigo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Nat. Ass'n., - So. 3d - (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Final Judgment Of Garnishment Reversed

UPDATE: The court released a new opinion, HERE, on rehearing.  The new opinion reached the same conclusion and is published at the following cite: GrayRobinson, P.A. v. Fireline Restoration, Inc., 46 So. 3d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

In GrayRobinson, P.A., et al v. Fireline Restoration, et al. (4D09-2102 & 4D09-2116), the Fourth District reversed a garnishment judgment against GrayRobinson and the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association and ordered that the writs of garnishment be dissolved.

After obtaining a judgment against Fireline, Works R Us had writs of garnishment issued against FIGA and GrayRobinson. Works R Us argued that money in GrayRobinson’s trust account belonged to FIGA and that it was going to be paid to Fireline. FIGA argued that it did not owe money to Fireline, however, the trial court disagreed and entered a judgment against both FIGA and GrayRobinson requiring that the money in the GrayRobinson trust account be turned over to Works R Us.

After a recitation of the underlying facts, the court noted that “Works R Us has no greater right than Fireline has to recover funds from FIGA or GrayRobinson.” the court stated:

The funds held by GrayRobinson have been paid in accordance with a court order in the Del Mar litigation with specific directions. Fireline and various creditors of Fireline, as well as Del Mar and FIGA itself, were allowed thirty days to file claims against those funds. Any claims filed beyond that time were deemed barred and waived. Any unclaimed funds would be returned to Del Mar. The record on summary judgment in this proceeding does not reveal whether Fireline filed a claim to the deposited funds. If it did not, then according to the judgment, its claim to them would be barred. In that case, owing no debt to Fireline, GrayRobinson would owe no monies to Works R Us.

The court referenced several orders from an unrelated litigation which can be viewed at the links below:

• Del Mar Ass'n, Inc. v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, No. 2006-0175-CA-03, 2008 WL 5705147 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 26, 2008);
• Del Mar Ass'n, Inc. v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, No. 2006-0175-CA-03, 2009 WL 6328786 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009);
• Del Mar Ass'n, Inc. v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, No. 2006-0175-CA-03, 2009 WL 6328788 (Fla. Cir. Ct. March 2, 2009); and
• Del Mar Ass'n, Inc. v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, No. 2006-0175-CA-03, 2009 WL 6328787 (Fla. Cir. Ct. April 2, 2009).

You can read a press release relating to the named appellee Fireline issued by the United States Securities & Exchange Commission HERE and a related complaint filed by the SEC HERE.  News articles can be found at the following links:

• BB&T seizes Brian Marshall’s yacht, seeks Ferrari and Bentley;
• Fireline Restoration subcontractor debts sounding alarms; 
• SEC filings detail unraveling of Fireline Restoration’s parent company;
• Profiting From Disaster With Lies;
• Tampa exec Brian Marshall helped create 'fantasyland of fraud,' SEC says;
• Feds investigate disaster Restoration execs;
• Brian Marshall companies seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection; 

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

WIND News to Use: FIGA v. Olympus

In its weekly newsletter, "WIND News to Use: Insurance News and Notes," The Windstorm Isurance Network quoted THIS blog post on Florida Insurance Guaranty Association v. Olympus Association, Inc., - So. 3d -, 4D09-11, 2010 WL 1979242, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 6941 (Fla. 4th DCA May 19, 2010).  The WIND newsletter is below:

WIND News to Use - Insurance News and Notes 05.21.2010

Insurer Can Challenge Coverage After Appraisal

In Florida Insurance Guaranty Association v. Olympus Association, Inc., - So. 3d -, 4D09-11, 2010 WL 1979242, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 6941 (Fla. 4th DCA May 19, 2010), the Fourth District reversed the trial court's order confirming an appraisal award and entry of a 5.5 million dollar judgment in favor of Olympus.  The court concluded that "As explained in Kennedy and supported by Fisher, FIGA could contest part of the liability without challenging coverage as a whole."  The court described the facts as follows:

Olympus’s public adjuster, Joseph Zevuloni, demanded an appraisal for Buildings 500, 600, and 2500...Tony Allogia was the appraiser for FIGA, and Michelle L. Antinucci was appointed as the Umpire. On May 30, 2008, the Umpire submitted an Appraisal of Insurance Claim—Award Form (Appraisal Award) to the appraisers. Zevuloni signed it on May 31, 2008, making the award valid and binding. The Appraisal Award totaled $7,102,879.76...There was also a separate sheet indicating the line-item appraisal amounts for each building, which in part indicated that of the total amount, $3,785,000 was allotted for Waterproofing/Painting.

[FIGA's] second Affirmative Defense stated that “[p]ursuant to the Policy, Form CP 01 25 06 95, painting or waterproofing material is not covered.” This policy provision, labeled “Windstorm Exterior Paint and Waterproofing Exclusion,” indicates that the policy does not cover loss or damage to paint or waterproofing material applied to the exterior of the buildings.

Olympus filed a Motion to Confirm Appraisal Award and Entry of Final Judgment. The trial court heard the motion, entered an Order granting it, and entered Final Judgment allowing Olympus to recover from FIGA the sum of $7,102,879.76 in principal, less $2,550,545.78 in building deductibles and a $100.00 FIGA deductible, for a total amount of $4,552,233.98.

With regard to the law, the court stated:

Appraisal clauses are preferred, as they provide a mechanism for prompt resolution of claims and discourage the filing of needless lawsuits. Issues relating to coverage challenges are questions exclusively for the  judiciary....In Liberty American Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 890 So. 2d 539, 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), the second district concluded that “the submission of the claim to appraisal does not foreclose Liberty American from challenging an element of loss as not being covered by the policy.”

***

Thus, the trial court erred by entering final judgment in favor of Olympus without first determining FIGA’s liability as to the coverage claims contested in its affirmative defenses. Although Licea made mention of challenging a “whole loss,” it is not reasonable to order an insurer to pay for all elements set forth by an appraiser if the insurer raises an issue of coverage as to only one element and not the whole claim. See Fisher v. Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Contract No. 242/99, 930 So. 2d 756, 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (stating, with regard to construing a policy too narrowly, that “[t]o do so would require us to turn a blind eye to what common sense dictates”). It is the appraiser’s duty to determine the amount of coverage, while questions of coverage liability are left for the judiciary. Licea, 685 So. 2d at 1287. Then, “[i]f a court decides that coverage exists, the dollar value agreed upon by the appraisal process will be binding upon both parties.” Id. at 1287–88. 

Our holding in Fisher v. Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Contract No. 242/99, 930 So. 2d 756, 759–60 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), further supports FIGA’s contention that the trial court erred in not permitting it to contest one element of the coverage.

***

Based on the above, we conclude that the trial court erred by entering final judgment in favor of Olympus and awarding it the amount set forth in the appraisal (less the deductibles), without first deciding the issue of coverage liability. When FIGA filed its affirmative defenses in response to Olympus’s complaint, the trial court should have first decided FIGA’s liability. As explained in Kennedy and supported by Fisher, FIGA could contest part of the liability without challenging coverage as a whole.

The entire opinion is below:

Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Olympus Association, Inc., - So. 3d -, 4D09-11, 2010 WL 1979242 (Fla. 4th DC...

The briefs can be viewed at the following links: Initial Brief; Answer Brief; and Reply Brief.

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Article About Derespina v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 19 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)

Derespina v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 19 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), discussed in a prior post HERE, was referenced in the article below:

And the Defense Wins - Feb. 10, 2010 (Derespina)

Motion To Dismiss A Trademark Infringement Action Denied

In RGS Labs International, Inc. v. The Sherwin-Williams Company, Et Al, No. 09-14242-CIV, 2010 WL 317778 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2010) the court denied a motion to dismiss.  The court held that the plaintiff, in a trademark infringement case, had properly pled a cause of action. 

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Order Denying Motion to Compel Appraisal Of Hurricane Damage Affirmed

In Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Shadow Wood Condominium Ass'n, - So. 3d -, 4D09-378, 2009 WL 4283083 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec 02, 2009), the Fourth District affirmed an order denying a motion to compel appraisal.

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Order Denying Motion to Compel Appraisal Affirmed

In Fla. Ins Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Devon Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc., - So. 3d -, 4D09-378, 2009 WL 4283084 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec 02, 2009), the Fourth District affirmed an order denying a motion to compel appraisal. The briefs filed in the Fourth District can be viewed at the following links: Initial Brief; Answer Brief; Reply Brief.

UPDATE: The Florida Supreme Court entered an order accepting jurisdiction to review this decision.  The docket can be viewed HERE.  That decision can be viewed at the following link: 2010 WL 3737637, 43 So. 3d 44 (Fla. Sep. 22, 2010). The briefs filed in the Florida Supreme Court are linked below:

• Jurisdictional Initial Brief - filed 03/12/10
• Jurisdictional Answer Brief - filed 04/06/10
• Initial Brief;
• Answer Brief; and
• Reply Brief.

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Third District Reverses Order That Quashed Service of Process

In Sun Trust Bank v. Electronic Wireless and Fabian Pesantes (3D09-1952), the Third District reversed the trial court's order quashing service of process.  The Court's six page opinion, writted by Judge Rothenberg, began:

SunTrust Bank seeks reversal of a non-final order quashing service of process on Electronic Wireless Corp. and Fabian Pesantes, contending that they “concocted a hodgepodge of both actual and fictional requirements” for service of process and that “SunTrust duly complied” with each of the actual requirements. We agree and reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The opinion is below:

Suntrust Bank v. Electronic Wireless, Et Al (3d09-1952) - Opinion

The briefs and oral argument in this case can be viewed below.

BRIEFS

*Appellees Motion to Dismiss Appeal

*Appellant's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal

*Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Appeal

*Appellant's Initial Brief

*Appellees' Answer Brief

*Appellant's Reply Brief

* Appendix to Appellant's Initial Brief on Appeal

ORAL ARGUMENT

Part I:


Part II:

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Presuit Affidavit From Sister In Med-Mal Case Properly Stricken

In Derespina v. North Broward Hospital District d/b/a Coral Springs Medical Center, 19 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (4D08-2670), the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's conclusion that a presuit notice in a medical malpractice action cannot be from a relative of the alleged victim.  The court stated:

Derespina alleged that the stocking was too small and caused blistering and eventually scarring. She instituted a medical malpractice action against NBHD.

***

Accompanying Derespina’s notice of intent to initiate litigation was the affidavit of her sister, a nurse with forty-six years of experience, who was also the mother of Derespina’s attorney. The affiant stated she had reviewed Derespina’s medical records and concluded the medical malpractice claim had merit.

***

After completing the pre-suit investigation a n d prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, the plaintiff must notify the defendant of her intent to initiate litigation. § 766.106(2). Section 766.203(2) requires that the notice be corroborated by a “verified written medical expert opinion” furnished to the defendant. § 766.203(2). If a court finds the plaintiff’s notice of intent to initiate litigation does not comply with the pre-suit investigation requirements of the statute, a court shall dismiss the claim. § 766.206(2).

NBHD relies on the case of Grau v. Wells, in which a patient brought a medical malpractice suit against his doctor after plastic surgery. 795 So.2d 988, 989 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)...The court concluded that the plaintiff could have easily obtained a nurse without family ties to give an expert opinion in the Fort Lauderdale area, but none was ever sought. Based upon the findings of the trial court after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court’s conclusion that the investigation of malpractice conducted by the plaintiff did not constitute the reasonable investigation contemplated by the statute was not an abuse of its discretion.

Derespina v. North Broward Hospital District DBA Coral Springs Medical Center.op

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Protective Order Denied Because Deposition Notice Was So Deficient It Could Simply Be Ignored

In John Daly Enterprises, LLC v. Hippo Golf Co., Inc., No. 08-61401-CIV, 2009 WL 4855455 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2009), the court makes it clear why it is important to comply with scheduling deadlines prior to noticing a deposition.  The court concluded that the deposition notice was so deficient that the court need not enter a protective order because the other party simply could simply ignore the deposition notice.   The court's decision is below:

•John Daly Enterprises, LLC v. Hippo Golf Co., Inc., No. 08-61401-CIV, (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2009)

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Partial Summary Judgment In John Daly v. Hippo Golf Trademark Infringement Case

In John Daly Enterprises, LLC v. Hippo Golf Co., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2009), the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part.  The plaintiff brought action the against for defendant's alleed breach of contract and infringement of plaintiff's intellectual property rights based on defendant's alleged display of plaintiff's name and likeness on its website.  The plaintiff also sought to pierce defendant's corporate veil. 

The court stated:

Infringement of a federally registered mark does not require use of the actual mark or a counterfeit thereof. Rather, it may include only a “colorable imitation” of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). A mark is a colorable imitation if it “so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion.” Id. § 1127. A mark may thus infringe a registered mark without using the entirety of the registered mark. In other words, “[i]t is not necessary that the alleged infringer use all aspects of the registered mark for likely confusion to result. For example, under the likelihood of confusion test, defendant is an infringer where it reproduces the words, but not the background design logo, of the plaintiff's registered composite mark.” 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23.76 (4th ed.2009) (quotation omitted).

The court granted the motion as to the alleged breach of contract noting that "Defendant has admitted liability on the breach of contract claim."  The court also ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the claim for violations of Fla. Stat. § 540.08.  The court, however, denied the motion as to damages and refused to pierce the corporate veil. 

The decision is below:

John Daly Enterprises, LLC v. Hippo Golf Co., Inc., --- F.Supp.2d ----, No. 08-61401-CIV, 2009 WL 2488272 (...

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Arbitrators Determine Challenge to Contract as a Whole - Not Court

In Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Blue Ocean's Distributing, LLC, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2009), Judge Ungaro held:

1.) The district court's retain jurisdiction over an action when they stay the case pending arbitration; and

2.) The arbitrators, and not the court, determine challenges to the validity of a contract as a whole. If the challenge was specifically to the arbitration clause, the court would determine the challenge. Judge Ungaro stated: "The Supreme Court has stated that, 'a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator." (internal citations omitted).

The decision is below:

Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Blue Ocean's Distributing, LLC, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Lis Pendens Effectuated Transfer Outside Preference Period

In a decision released in January, In re Matthew J. Whitehead, III, 399 B.R. 570 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009), the judgment creditor argued that the lis pendens filed at the start of the underlying state court action brought the judgment outside the preference period. Judge Olsen in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida held the "[i]n accord with 11 U.S.C. § 547, Fla. Stat. § 48.23, and applicable case law, I find the Notices of Lis Pendens to have effectuated a transfer of the property outside of the statutory preference period." Therefore, the creditor was granted relief from the automatic stay.

The decision is below:

•In re Matthew J. Whitehead, III, 399 B.R. 570 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009)

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

ERISA Preempts Florida State Whistleblower Claim

In Am. Maritime Off. Union v. Merriken, 981 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), the Fourth DCA held that plaintiff's state law whistleblower claim was preempted by ERISA.  The plaintiff was the former executive director of the American Maritime Officers Plans (pension, benefit, etc.). According to the allegations in the complaint, the plaintiff agreed to wear a wire for the United States Department of Labor in exchange for immunity from prosecution.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendants discovered he was cooperating with the government and had him terminated.  Entering a writ of prohibition, the court stated:

Arguing federal preemption under ERISA, the Union and the Plans moved to dismiss the complaint. One argument was that ERISA grants a specific remedy for the same retaliatory discharge and/or interference with a protected right that Merriken asserts. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140. The trial court denied the motion concluding that the stated causes of action were not preempted by federal law, as the state actions did not encroach on the relationships regulated by ERISA. The trial court reasoned that the relationship between the Union and the Plans and the plaintiff is one of employer-employee, and there are no allegations that could be interpreted that the termination was in order to avoid benefit payments. The trial court concluded that there will be no need for it to rule on any issues of federal law, based on the allegations in the complaint. This petition follows.

Federal preemption is an affirmative defense, which may be raised in a motion to dismiss. Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 568 (Fla. 2005). In Boca Burger, the supreme court noted that Florida courts, “including this Court, have held that the issue of federal preemption is a question of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Because prohibition lies to prevent a court from proceeding in a suit in which it has no subject-matter jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction. See Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 605 So. 2d 850, 854 n.5 (Fla. 1992).

***

In this case, the conduct under the Florida Whistle-blower statute on which Merriken has sued is protected under 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (ERISA section 510), which expressly states: “It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter . . . .”

***

In opposition to this clear and substantial authority, Merriken argues that section 1140 does not apply, because he sued the Plans themselves and not a person, and section 1140 can be violated only by a “person.” A trust is a “person” under ERISA, and he has alleged that the Plans are trusts. A labor union is an “employee organization” and thus the Union is also a person within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, section 1140 applies. The cases Merriken cites in support of his position that the Plans cannot be sued are simply inapposite and do not involve an employee of the plan itself suing the employer-plan for wrongful discharge.

Because the whistleblower activities alleged in Merriken’s complaint are protected by section 1140, the matter is preempted by federal law. Ingersoll-Rand [Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)]. The circuit court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to consider these actions.

Am. Maritime Off. Union v. Merriken, 981 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Article About American Maritime Officers Union v. Merriken Trial Victory

The case that led to the decisions discussed here (Am. Maritime Off. Union v. Merriken, 981 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)) and here (Merriken v. Am. Maritime Off. Vacation Plan, et al, 08-60687, 2008 WL 4899126, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2008)) was discussed here. The discussion is below:

And the Defense Wins - 3-11-2009

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Eleventh Circuit Affirms District Court's Dismissal In ERISA Botox Case

In Kaplan v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 07-11699, 2008 WL 4926623, 07-11699 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2008), the Eleventh Circuit held the district court correctly found that BCBSF did not misinterpret the language of the Kaplan’s health insurance plan when it denied their claims."   The opinion is below:

Kaplan v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 07-11699, 2008 WL 4926623, 07-11699 (11th Cir. Nov. ...

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

ERISA Case Dismissed For Missing Statute Of Limitation

This ERISA case, Merriken v. Am. Maritime Off. Vacation Plan, et al, 08-60687, 2008 WL 4899126, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2008), was dismissed based upon the controlling statute of limitations.  The decision is below:

Merriken v. Am. Maritime Off. Vacation Plan, Et Al, 08-60687, 2008 WL 4899126, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2008)

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.

Injunction Reversed for Improper Notice

In a proceeding supplementary case, the Third DCA in Wavestone Props., LLC v. Fortune Dev. Sales Corp., 978 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) "reverse[d] the temporary injunction against 17315, and the order impressing the judgment lien upon the property owned by 17315. We do so because the request for this relief had not been noticed for hearing, and there was a timely objection on this ground." The court also held that it was improper to enter an injunction when the relief was not requested in a motion.

As to piercing the corporate veil, which was reversed for the procedural issues discussed above, the court gave no opinion other than to state that any attempt to pierce the corporate veil "must satisfy the standards of Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984)."

The decision is below:

Wavestone Props., LLC v. Fortune Dev. Sales Corp., 978 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)

The oral argument that took place in this appeal is below:

Argument 

Response

Rebuttal

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.