Decedent's Wife Entitled to Life Estate with Homestead Status

In Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Giblin (4D08-1117) the Fourth DCA affirmed the circuit court's order concluding that the decedents child and former wife were protected by Florida's homestead laws. The Fourth DCA stated:

Decedent and Nivia Giblin were married in 1959. They had a daughter together. In 1981 they separated but never divorced. In 2000, decedent purchased a piece of residential property in Broward County. Title to the property was placed in the decedent’s name. The wife and daughter lived in the home, but decedent never did. Decedent died in 2001.

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The language of article X, section 4 is clear and unambiguous. Here, decedent was a natural person who owned property occupied by his wife and child at the time of his death; thus, the property is homestead. Because decedent died leaving a spouse, the descent of his property is controlled by section 732.401(1), Florida Statutes (2001). As such, the wife is entitled to a life estate in the homestead with a vested remainder to the descendants. § 732.401(1), Fla. Stat.

Computer Software is not Tangible Property

The Fourth DCA joined the anti-tax protests on April 15, 2009 and affirmed the circuit court's decision that Palm Beach County could not tax computer software owned by Verizon Wireless. The court in Nikolits v. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications, L.P. (4D08-1389) held:

A close examination of the definition of tangible personal property contained in section 192.001 compels the same result. In particular, that definition states that tangible personal property is “all goods, chattels, and other articles of value . . . capable of manual possession and whose chief value is intrinsic to the article itself.” § 192.001(11)(d). Although computer software’s value is intrinsic in and of itself, as the “essence of the property is the software itself, and not the tangible medium on which the software might be stored,” Gilreath, 751 So. 2d at 708, it is property incapable of manual possession. This is because, software, itself, is “not capable of being ‘seen, weighed, measured, felt or otherwise perceived by the senses.’” Id. (quoting Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Tech Data Corp., 930 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. App. 1996)). Rather, the tangible medium on which it is transported and transmitted is the means by which the property is manually possessed.

Therefore, we agree with the Fifth District’s decision in Gilreath and hold that “computer software” is intangible personal property. As such, we affirm the trial court’s decision that the Wireless Services Software is not taxable by Palm Beach County, as it is intangible personal property, which is property outside a county’s taxing authority.