Injunction Allowing Player To Play In State Basketball Championships Reversed

In Florida High School Athletic Association, Inc. v. Delancy (3D11-390), the Third District vacated an order and dissolved the temporary injunction. The trial court entered an "order temporarily enjoining FHSAA from disqualifying a high school basketball player and his team from participation in the end-of-season basketball state championship series."  Because the "order and the record contain no findings sufficient to sustain such an injunction" the Third District stated "we vacate the order and dissolve the temporary injunction."

The court stated:

In Florida, high school basketball and other athletics are assigned by statute to FHSAA, a non-profit corporation, for overall regulation and enforcement.  The pertinent statutes and the FHSAA’s by-laws are plainly calculated to allow member schools (public and private) to resolve the kinds of issues presented here, with judicial intervention only in exceptional circumstances that have not been demonstrated here.  See Fla. High School Activities Ass’n. v. Bradshaw, 369 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Fla. High School Activities Ass’n. v. Melbourne Central Catholic High School, 867 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Fla. High School Activities Ass’n. v. Benitez, 748 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Fla. High School Activities Ass’n. v. Adderly, 574 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (each reversing similar injunctions for similar reasons).

Reversed; temporary injunction dissolved.  This decision shall take effect immediately, and the mandate shall be released simultaneously with this opinion without regard to any motion for rehearing or rehearing en banc. 

Eleventh Circuit Reverses Injunction Against FDIC Relating To Colonial Loans

In Bank of America v. Colonial Bank (09-14739), the Eleventh Circuit reversed a temporary injunction (discussed HERE) because the district court lacked "jurisdiction to enjoin the FDIC as receiver and that Bank of America must first exhaust the administrative claims process prior to seeking a judicial remedy."  Writing for a panel that included Justice O'Connor, Judge Anderson stated:

This case arises from the collapse of Colonial Bank (“Colonial”), the fifth largest bank failure in the near 77-year history of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of America”), brought this action against Colonial, alleging it wrongfully refused to return thousands of mortgage loans and their proceeds, valued in excess of $1 billion, to which Bank of America had legal title. On August 13, 2009, the district court entered a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against Colonial, prohibiting the bank from taking any action with respect to the disputed assets. The next day, the FDIC was appointed as receiver for Colonial, and was promptly substituted as defendant in this case. Thereafter, the district court converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction against the FDIC, rejecting the FDIC’s arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the FDIC as receiver and that Bank of America must first exhaust the administrative claims process prior to seeking a judicial remedy. The FDIC filed both a timely appeal of the district court’s preliminary injunction order and a petition for a writ of mandamus to dissolve the district court’s preliminary injunction. We consolidated the two actions and expedited this appeal.

Our inquiry in this case is limited to the threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction. The FDIC argues that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), 12 U.S.C. §1821(j), deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin the FDIC because the preliminary injunction unlawfully restrained the FDIC’s exercise of its receivership powers and functions. Because we conclude that the FDIC’s proposed actions with respect to the loans and loan proceeds at issue fall squarely within its statutory receivership powers and functions, we hold that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) stripped the district court of its jurisdiction to enter the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss Bank of America’s motion for a preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction.

Injunction Reversed For Failing To Meet Any Of The Required Elements

In Biscayne Park, LLC v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP (3D08-3219), the Third District reversed the entry of a temporary injunction.  In a concurring opinion, with a little humor, Judge Schwartz stated:

A preliminary injunction must be based on four indispensable elements. See Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d 732, 736 (Fla. 1975). In my opinion, the one in this case is supported by none of them. Apart from that, it’s fine.

The court's opinion stated:

The well-established requirements for the issuance of a temporary injunction are: (1) the likelihood of irreparable harm and the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law; (2) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (3) that the threatened injury to the petitioner outweighs any possible harm to the respondent; and, (4) the entry of the injunction will not disserve the public interest......A review of the proceedings below demonstrates that Wal-Mart’s alleged injury was its possible monetary liability resulting from possible future contamination to groundwater through the wells. “[T]his court has previously held that the granting of injunctive relief is improper when a plaintiff’s right to recover is based upon a future event,”.....Because the alleged injury is speculative, we conclude that it is insufficient to meet the irreparable injury standard.....Additionally, in the event that such an alleged event were to occur, Wal-Mart would have an adequate remedy at law, i.e., a claim for money damages.

While Judge Schwartz does not below the injunction satisfied any of the required elements, Judge Gersten disagreed.  In a dissent, he stated:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the temporary injunction because the requirements for issuing one were satisfied. Trial courts have wide discretion in granting or denying a temporary injunction, and appellate courts will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless the party challenging the grant or denial clearly shows an abuse of discretion....Therefore, the trial court properly and responsibly granted the temporary injunction on legal, apparent environmental concerns. The trial court was well within its discretion in protecting Wal-Mart from liability for the environmental damage. Moreover, the trial court acted responsibly to protect against further damage to our over-indulged, over-taxed, and under-protected environment. In fact, I feel that a reversal in these circumstances is a slap in the face to a hardworking trial judge who was only doing his job . . . well....Accordingly, because Wal-Mart satisfied the requirements for the temporary injunction and the issue is now moot, I respectfully dissent. On an end note, I regret the expenditure of paper resources used in the writing of both the majority and dissent, but reiterate that I would affirm the order granting Wal-Mart’s verified motion for temporary injunction.

(emphasis added).

Dismissal and Fee Award Reversed - Concurrent Jurisdiction For Injunctions AND Not Prevailing Party When Dismissal Without Prejudice

In Mitchell v. The Beach Club of Hallandale Association, Inc. (4D08-2123 and 4D09-1903), the Fourth District reversed the trial court's dismissal.  The trial court dismissed a complaint seeking an injunction without prejudice to be refiled if it satisfied the jurisdictional threshold for the circuit court.  The trial court also awarded the association attorneys fees as the prevailing party.

Regarding the dismissal:

County and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction over equitable matters, including those requesting injunctive relief, regardless of the amount in controversy. See Baldwin Sod Farms, Inc. v. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d 1198, 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“county courts and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction over matters in equity, including injunctions”). Under section 34.01(4), Florida Statutes, county courts “may” hear matters in equity involving sums within the jurisdictional amount of the county court. Thus, county court jurisdiction is not exclusive. The court erred in applying the monetary jurisdictional limit to dismiss this complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Regarding the fee award the court stated:

We also reverse the award of prevailing party attorney’s fees. Not only is this necessary because of our reversal of the order dismissing, the Association did not “prevail” where the complaint was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds without prejudice to refile. See Shaw v. Schlusemeyer, 683 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

Fourth District Affirms Imposition Of Injunction, Reverses For More Specificity

In 4Uortho, LLC v. Practice Partners, Inc. (4D09-695), held that "We find no error with regard to the trial court’s decision to enter the temporary injunction, but reverse and remand as a portion of the order is vague and requires clarification."

As to the facts relating to the injunction, the court stated:

In early May of 2008, Farwell and Williams both resigned from their positions at Practice Partners, only to be hired several days later by 4UOrtho. Two months later, Elaine Morgan, a non-party to this lawsuit, also resigned from Practice Partners and accepted a position with 4UOrtho. Consequently, on August 7, 2008, Practice Partners filed its complaint, including claims for injunctive relief. In response, then counsel for 4UOrtho provided a written termination of the confidentiality agreement to Practice Partners on August 27, 2008. Practice Partners sought a temporary injunction, and three evidentiary hearings took place, after which, the trial court entered an order temporarily enjoining 4UOrtho from: employing Farwell, Williams, Morgan or any other current or past employee of Practice Partners until August 27, 2009; disclosing any confidential information until August 27, 2014; soliciting any practices which are current or prospective clients of Practice Partners and its affiliates; and offering employment or otherwise soliciting employment to any past Practice Partners employee under a non-compete agreement or any current Practice Partners employee until August 27, 2009.

With regard to the law, the court stated:

To establish that an agreement itself is lawful and enforceable, a party must “‘plead and prove the existence of one or more legitimate business interests justifying the restrictive covenant.’” Once the proponent of the injunction has established that the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that the agreement is overbroad or otherwise not reasonably necessary. Id. A trial court’s ruling on a motion for a temporary injunction shall not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion...

Nonetheless, “one against whom [an injunction] is directed should not be left in doubt about what he is to do.” On appeal, 4UOrtho contends that the portion of the injunction preventing it “from soliciting a n y practices which are current or prospective clients of Practice Partners and the PPI affiliates,” is vague or overbroad. We agree and first direct the trial court to amend this portion of the injunction by defining prospective clients....Secondly, we direct the trial court to apply a time restriction to this portion of the order as well.

Judge Jordan Enters Temporary Restraining Order Preventing Colonial Bank From Liquidating One Billion in Mortgages

Colonial Bank failed today and was acquired by BB&T. [Click here and here for articles.] Relevant here is the temporary restraining order entered by Southern District of Florida Judge Adalberto Jordan yesterday. The TRO can be found here and is discussed at the AM Law Litigation Daily here. Judge Jordan's TRO states:

Relations between Bank of America and Colonial soured when it came to light in late-July of 2009 that Colonial was not in compliance with the Federal Reserve’s capital requirements and was on the verge of insolvency. See Complaint at ¶¶ 18–19. Subsequent revelations indicated that Colonial was the subject of a criminal probe by the Department of Justice, in part due to accounting irregularities related to its mortgage warehouse lending division.

***

In its motion, Bank of America argues that the circumstances warrant the ex parte injunctive relief sought here. On this record, I agree.

***

Pending the hearing and determination of the motion for preliminary injunction, Colonial Bank and the John Doe Defendants, and all persons acting under their direction or control, or in concert with them, are hereby enjoined and restrained from selling, pledging, assigning, liquidating, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise disposing of all or any portion of (a) the proceeds paid by Freddie Mac to Colonial Bank, as trustee, custodian, bailee, and agent, for certain mortgage loans and corresponding loan documents owned by Ocala Funding, LLC (”Ocala”), and (b) certain mortgage loans and corresponding loan documents delivered to Colonial Bank, as trustee, custodian, bailee, and agent, which were not purchased by Freddie Mac as set forth on the schedule annexed hereto as Schedule A to the complaint in this action.

Third DCA Reverses Imposition of Lis Pendens

In Strategic Empowerment for Economic Development, Inc. v. South Dade Realty, Inc. (3D08-2995), the Third District reversed a trial court's order relating to the filing of a lis pendens.

The trial court granted the appellants motion to dissolve a lis pendens, however, at the same time stated “The Notice of Lis Pendens shall constitute an equitable lien upon the net proceeds from the sale of any or all of the above described real property, to secure payment of the real estate brokerage commission allegedly owed to [SDR] by [SEED], pending the resolution of this action.”

The Third District held:

Setting aside the highly improbable proposition that a lis pendens can reach, affect, or in any way encumber the cash proceeds of a real estate closing that has yet to occur...the scant record in this case—an unsworn complaint, a lis pendens signed by counsel alone, and an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint—does not satisfy even the most rudimentary of conditions for entry of a mandatory injunction without written or oral notice to the adverse party, see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610, which most assuredly is what SDR intended by the filing of its lis pendens in this case.

In this respect, the case before us is not at all analogous to either Cohen Financial LP v. KMC/EC II, LLC, 967 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), or Riverland & Indian Sun L.C. v. L.J. Melody & Co., 879 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), both of which proceeded upon a filed motion for the entry of a temporary injunction. For this reason, we summarily reverse the order on appeal with the direction that any prejudgment interdiction of the real estate proceeds of the closing of this real estate transaction by the trial court in this case be abandoned forthwith.

This opinion will take effect immediately, notwithstanding the filing of any motions for rehearing.

Three Opinions Relating to Same Temporary Injunction

The Second District issued three opinions today stemming from the same injunction order. The opinions are: LaRose and The University of Tampa v. A.K. (2D08-1996), LaRose and The University of Tampa v. A.K. (2D08-3756) and LaRose and The University of Tampa v. A.K. (2D08-5622).

The facts of the underlying dispute are:

A.K. filed a multiple-count complaint1 asserting that Anthony P. LaRose (Professor LaRose) and the University of Tampa (the University) had unfairly accused her and found her to have committed plagiarism. She alleged that the University had entered a grade of "F" for Professor LaRose's Criminology Class 321 based upon the plagiarism issues. Among other claims, A.K. requested "a temporary injunction commanding [the University] to remove the Academic Integrity violation and the four (4) hour 'F' for Criminology Class 321 from [A.K.'s] student file to preserve the status quo, and issue a permanent injunction following rendition of final judgment for [A.K.] after trial on the merits."

In LaRose and The University of Tampa v. A.K. (2D08-1996), the court affirmed the entry of a temporary injunction. The trial court applied the correct test and found each of the four elements satisfied. The four elements of an injunction are:

"A temporary injunction may be granted only if the movant establishes (1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) unavailability of an adequate legal remedy; (3) a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits; and (4) considerations of the public interest support the entry of the injunction."

In LaRose and The University of Tampa v. A.K. (2D08-3756), the court reversed the trial court's order granting A.K.'s Motion to Enforce Temporary Injunction. "A preliminary injunction is improperly entered when it bypasses the procedures for a permanent injunction and preliminarily grants the same relief that would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction." The court held that the order at issue improperly expanded upon the temporary injunction to provide permanent injunctive relief.

In LaRose and The University of Tampa v. A.K. (2D08-5622), the court dismissed A.K. Petition seeking review of the trial court's order denying her motion for contempt. The court held:

Due to our prior reversal of one of the two orders which A.K. sought to enforce by contempt, we conclude that the instant proceeding is moot and that it would be inappropriate to grant certiorari relief. Additionally, we observe that because A.K. may again seek to enforce the remaining order granting temporary injunctive relief on remand, A.K. cannot be found to have sustained the lasting material injury necessary to invoke this court's certiorari jurisdiction. See DeLoach v. Aird, 989 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Temporary Injunction Order Must Make Specific Factual Finding for Each Element of Injunction

In Jouvence Center for Advanced Health, LLC v. Jouvence Rejuvenation Centers, LLC (4D08-4753), the Fourth DCA reversed the entry of a temporary injunction. The injunction order enjoined the appellant "from continuing use of Appellee[s']...patient files and proprietary information and establishing an injunction bond of $1000."

“A trial court's ruling on a temporary injunction comes to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness, reversible only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion...A party seeking a temporary injunction must prove: (1) that it will suffer irreparable harm unless the status quo is maintained; (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public interest...The party must also establish that it has a clear legal right to the relief sought...Finally, a trial court must make clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings supporting each of the required elements before entering an injunction."

"the trial court neglected to make specific findings of fact regarding the four elements which must be shown before a preliminary injunction may be entered, and we reverse and remand for the trial court to make the required findings. Whether additional evidence is needed in order to make the necessary findings, we leave to the trial court’s determination."

Injunction Reversed for Lack of Notice to Members of Unincorporated Association

In Mt. Nebo Missionary Baptist Church v. Glee (1D07-6359), the First District granted the appellants motion to quash service of process and to reverse an order reinstating a deacon.

"As this court found in Walton-Okaloosa-Santa Rosa Medical Society v. Spires, 153 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963), an injunction issued against an unincorporated association, whose individual members were not served notice, is not binding on that association. Here, it is uncontested that Mt. Nebo was an unincorporated association and that its individual members were not served notice. Therefore, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over Mt. Nebo, and the trial court’s order that appellee be "reinstated as a deacon in the Defendant/Church" is not binding on Mt. Nebo."

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Order Enjoining Litigant from Bringing Action

In Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield (08-15395), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge Moreno's order permanently enjoining the appellant from bringing suit against Blue Cross. The decision discusses a number of different legal theories including claim preclusion, the impact of a bankruptcy stay, laches, equitable challenges, the power of a court to adjudicate issues not raised and issues raised for the first time on appeal.

Facts

Judge Moreno issued the injunction based upon the judgment entered in a prior case pending before him. The prior case, Love, et al. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, et al., No. 03-21296-CV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2008), "alleged that Blue Cross cheated doctors by devising ways to delay, diminish, and deny properly requested payments based on their cost instead of medical necessity. In 2007 Blue Cross agreed to settle the case for $130,000,000 and an agreement to change many of its business practices. Most notably, Blue Cross agreed to use medical standards and scientific evidence in making its “medical necessity” determinations. The settlement agreement also included a release designed to prevent doctors who were members of the plaintiff class from pursuing further claims based on the same actions by Blue Cross. Notices of the preliminary Love settlement were mailed to Dr. Jemsek and the Jemsek clinic in July 2007. A summary notice was also published in USA Today, the Wall Street Journal, the Journal of the American Medical Association, and the American Medical News. Neither Dr. Jemsek nor the Jemsek clinic opted out of the plaintiff class. Accordingly, they were bound by the settlement agreement when the district court issued its final approval in April 2008."

"The district court’s order enjoined Jemsek from bringing, against any Blue Cross defendant, claims that: [A]re, were, or could have been asserted against any of the Released Parties by reason of, arising out of, or in any way related to the facts, acts, events, transactions, occurrences, courses of conduct, business practices, representations, omissions, circumstances, or other matters referenced in the [Love] Action, or addressed in the Settlement Agreement, whether any such Claim was or could have been asserted by any Releasing Party on its own behalf or on behalf of other Persons . . . . This includes, without limitation and as to Released Parties only, any aspect of any fee for service claim submitted by any Class Member."

Blue Cross sued the doctor in North Carolina and the doctor responded by filing bankruptcy, removing the action to the North Carolina bankruptcy court and filing nine compulsory counterclaims in the North Carolina bankruptcy court. In response, Blue Cross moved the Florida district court to enjoin the doctor from bringing the action.

Claim Preclusion

“In order for claim preclusion to apply, four elements are required: (1) a final judgment on the merits; (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) identity of the parties; (4) identity of the causes of action."

***

An “identical factual predicate” requires only a common nucleus of operative fact.

***

"We hold that Dr. Jemsek’s counterclaims and the Love action, both of which arise out of Blue Cross’ conniving to deny, diminish, or delay payment for covered services based on cost instead of medical necessity, share the same operative nucleus of fact."

Claims Not Before the Court

"But “even when the court does not have power to adjudicate a claim, it may still approve release of that claim as a condition of settlement of an action before it...Given a broad enough settlement agreement— which it clearly was—and provided that Jemsek had notice of it and an opportunity to opt out, it is perfectly acceptable for the Love action to preclude his claims, even if they could not have been part of that action itself.

Bankruptcy Court's Automatic Stay

"Next, Dr. Jemsek contends that the district court’s injunction against his counterclaims should not be enforced because it violated the automatic stay in his bankruptcy case...Under the plain language of the [11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1–3)], Jemsek’s counterclaims against Blue Cross are not “against the debtor,” and thus were not subject to the automatic stay...Therefore, the bankruptcy stay created by § 362 did not “cement” Jemsek’s claims into his sealed estate and thereby shield them from the Florida district court’s order in the Love action. Jemsek’s counterclaims were not stayed, so there is no reason why the judgment in the Love action could not foreclose them...

Nor did the Florida district court improperly “exercise control over property of the estate” under § 362(a)(3) by requiring Jemsek to choose whether to opt out of the Love action. Given that his counterclaims, though they may be “property of the estate,” were not stayed by the automatic bankruptcy stay, they were open to possible defeat by Blue Cross’ defenses. It would not make sense under a plain reading of the statute to treat raising a defense against a non-stayed counterclaim as an “exercise of control over property.”

Arguments Raised for the First Time on Appeal

“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not properly before this Court.” Hurley v. Moore, 233 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1549 (11th Cir. 1990).

Fourth District Affirms Holding that Three Days Notice Sufficient for Entry of Temporary Injunction

In Lamour v. Deer Run Property Owners Association, Inc. (4D08-3960), the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's entry of a temporary injunction. The issue related to notice of the hearing on the temporary injunction and the Fourth District affirmed because notice was sent to counsel for the defendant with sufficient time to prepare for the hearing.

Notice of the hearing on the temporary injunction was faxed to counsel for the defendant on a Friday and the hearing was held on the following Monday. The attorney was apparently on a ski trip, however, had not filed a notice of unavailability. [The court specifically noted that filing a notice of unavailability may not have solved the issue].

The fax was received at 9:23 am and, therefore, delivery was complete on that date. Giving three days notice, albeit a weekend, was sufficient notice for the entry of a temporary injunction.

Fourth DCA Certified Question of Great Public Importance Relating to Injunction of Assets

Today in M I Industries USA, Inc. v. Attorneys Title Insurance Fund, LLC (4D007-4992) the Fourth DCA certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:

INCIDENT TO AN ACTION AT LAW, MAY A TRIAL COURT ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO FREEZE ASSETS OF A DEFENDANT, WHERE THE PLAINTIFF HAS DEMONSTRATED: (1) THE DEFENDANT WILL TRANSFER, DISSIPATE, OR HIDE HIS/HER ASSETS SO AS TO RENDER A TRIAL JUDGMENT UNENFORCEABLE; (2) A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED; (3) A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS; AND (4) A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST?

Non-Compete Agreements, Injunctions and Lost Documents

In Environmental Svs. v. Carter (5D08-3224), Judge Orfinger has an excellent analysis of non-compete agreements, along with a discussion about injunctions and lost originals. If these topics are of interest to you, the extensive analysis is worth reading.

Permanent Injunction Must Specify Reasons for Entry

In Premier Lab Supply, Inc. v. Chemplex Indus., Inc. (4D07-3933) the Fourth DCA reversed the entry of a permanent injunction because "Based on the clear wording of the rule [Rule 1.610 (c)], the specificity requirement applies to both temporary and permanent injunctions." The injunction failed to specify the reasons for its entry and, therefore, was improper. The court also discussed trade secrets and the plaintiff's successful claim.

Injunction Reversed for Improper Notice

In a proceeding supplementary case, the Third DCA in Wavestone Props., LLC v. Fortune Dev. Sales Corp., 978 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) "reverse[d] the temporary injunction against 17315, and the order impressing the judgment lien upon the property owned by 17315. We do so because the request for this relief had not been noticed for hearing, and there was a timely objection on this ground." The court also held that it was improper to enter an injunction when the relief was not requested in a motion.

As to piercing the corporate veil, which was reversed for the procedural issues discussed above, the court gave no opinion other than to state that any attempt to pierce the corporate veil "must satisfy the standards of Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984)."

The decision is below:

Wavestone Props., LLC v. Fortune Dev. Sales Corp., 978 So.2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)

The oral argument that took place in this appeal is below:

Argument 

Response

Rebuttal

*Disclaimer: Jeffrey Kuntz and/or GrayRobinson, P.A. were involved in the above-referenced action.