Insurance Appraisal: What Comes First A Coverage Or Damage Determination?

In Citizens Property Insurance Company v. Michigan Condominium Association (4D10-1794), the Fourth District concluded that the trial court erred by ordering an appraisal without first determining coverage disputes.  The court certified conflict with Sunshine State  Ins. Co. v. Rawlins, 34 So. 3d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), which was discussed in an earlier post HERE. There are other opinions, including an en banc opinion, from the Third District which it also conflicts with, however, the court did not note conflict with those decisions.  The Fourth District stated:

We appreciate the third district’s rationale that the dual-track approach may save  “‘judicial  resources  which  might  otherwise  be required  in  resolving  the  factual  and  legal  issues  involved  in  the [coverage  issue]  by  a  relatively  swift  and informal  decision  by the appraisers  as  to  the  amount  of  the  loss.’”...However,  we  believe  that  “[a]  finding  of  liability  necessarily  precedes  a determination of damages.”

UPDATE: It is noteworthy that while the court did certify conflict, jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court was not invoked.  Therefore, this conflict will remain and will have to be resolved another day.

[I typed this post on the date that is indicated as its publication date.  I saw THIS post on Abstract Appeal and realized I had never officially published my post.  Thanks to Matt at Abstract Appeal!]

Conflict Certified To Supreme Court On Interlocutory Jurisdiction To Consider Citizens Bad Faith Issue

In Citizens Property Insurance Corporation v. San Perdido Association, Inc. (1D09-6183), a divided panel of the First District both certified conflict and certified the case as one of great public importance.  The majority concluded:

Citizens’ petition for prohibition or certiorari is denied, and pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) and (vi) this court certifies conflict with the fifth district decisions in Garfinkel and La Mer Condominium Assoc., and further certifies the following question of great public importance:

Whether, in light of the supreme court’s ruling in Department of Education v. Roe, 679 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1996), review of the denial of a motion to dismiss based on a claim of sovereign immunity should await the entry of a final judgment in the trial court?

The Garfinkel decision was discussed in a prior post at THIS link and the briefs and oral argument were posted at THIS link. 

In this First District action, Judge Clark wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Judge Davis. Judge Wetherell wrote a dissenting opinion.  The majority described the facts as follows:

This case arises from a claim by San Perdido under a windstorm insurance policy with Citizens, after Hurricane Ivan caused substantial property damage in 2004. Citizens persistently refused to fully pay its obligation under the terms of the insurance policy, requiring San Perdido to file a circuit court action to compel such payment, and then defend that award in Citizens’ appeal to this court. The circuit court ruling was upheld by this court, in Citizens Property Insurance v. San Perdido Assoc., 22 So. 3d 71 (Fla 1st DCA 2009), and San Perdido thereafter filed its section 624.155 bad faith action in the circuit court. Citizens responded with a motion to dismiss, asserting that the action is barred by the immunity conferred on Citizens in section 627.351(6), Florida Statutes. Citizens argued that this statutory provision grants it sovereign immunity.

***

In its section 624.155 action, San Perdido alleged that Citizens engaged in a series of bad faith practices in its handling of San Perdido’s insurance claim, and that such conduct was both a breach of contract and a willful tort under section 624.155. In denying Citizens’ motion to dismiss, the trial court reasoned that San Perdido’s section 627.155 lawsuit is within the section 627.351(6)(s)(1) exceptions to Citizens’ immunity. Although Citizens could challenge that ruling after an adverse judgment if San Perdido should prevail on the merits of its lawsuit at trial, Citizens now seeks an immediate writ of prohibition or certiorari, and asks this court to preclude any further proceedings in the trial court.

With regard to the legal issue, the court stated:

Contrary to the supreme court’s pronouncements in Roe, the fifth district has issued writs of prohibition where Citizens claimed sovereign immunity in response to a section 624.155 lawsuit for bad faith insurance practices. See Citizens Property Insurance v. Garfinkel, 25 So. 3d 62 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); see also Citizens Property Insurance v. La Mer Condominium Assoc., 37 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Like the present case, in those instances Citizens’ motions to dismiss the section 624.155 action were denied by the trial court. In undertaking immediate review of those rulings, the fifth district referred to the supreme court’s earlier decision in Circuit Court of Twelfth Judicial Circuit v. Department of Natural Resources, 339 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1976), and treated the matter as a question of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. But the fifth district did not refer to or otherwise acknowledge the supreme court’s more recent ruling in Roe, which characterized the jurisdictional theory in Circuit Court of Twelfth Judicial Circuit as an approach which pertained "at one time," but which no longer applied. As Roe suggested, there is no irreparable harm in requiring that appellate consideration of the sovereign immunity claim await the entry of a final judgment.

Without the irreparable harm required for certiorari, and given the supreme court’s repudiation of the Circuit Court of Twelfth Judicial Circuit theory of jurisdiction in Roe, Citizens is not entitled to immediate interlocutory review of the denial of its motion to dismiss San Perdido’s section 624.155 lawsuit.

The dissent began:

I respectfully dissent from the decision to dismiss Citizens’ "Petition for Writ of Prohibition, and Alternatively, Petition for Writ of Certiorari." I would grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order denying Citizens’ motion to dismiss because, as the Fifth District correctly held in Garfinkel, "Citizens is immune from first-party bad faith claims pursuant to Section 627.351(6)([s])1." See 25 So. 3d at 69.

I agree with the majority that prohibition is not the appropriate remedy in this case because Citizens’ claim of immunity does not implicate the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. But I disagree that we lack jurisdiction to consider Citizens’ alternative petition for writ of certiorari. In my view, not only do we have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(3) and 9.100 to consider the petition, but it is incumbent upon us to do so at this time because the trial court’s erroneous order denying Citizens immunity from Respondent’s suit will cause material injury to Citizens that cannot be fully remedied upon plenary appeal. Nothing in Roe compels the decision reached by the majority.

***

I recognize that the injury that Citizens will suffer in this particular case is diminished somewhat by the likelihood that the merits of the immunity issue will be back before this court in relatively short order. Indeed, if and when the issue is raised again by Citizens at the trial court (either through a renewed motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment), the court will be obligated to follow the holding in Garfinkel and dismiss Respondent’s bad faith suit against Citizens.

(Emphasis added).  The oral argument in this case was held on May 19, 2010 and will be posted below later today:

Petitioner's Argument

Respondent's Argument

Petitioner's Rebuttal Argument

After the oral argument, the Court entered an order requiring supplemental briefing.  That order is copied below:

Supplemental briefing is hereby requested from the appellant on the question of whether this court may properly consider the merits of the appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition or certiorari, in light of the supreme court's reasoning in Dep't of Education v. Roe, 679 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1996), and the approval in that case of this court's decision in Dep't of Education v. Roe, 656 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). See also, e.g., School Board of Miami-Dade County v. Leyva, 975 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). The appellant's supplemental brief should be filed within 15 days from the date of this order. The appellee may file a supplemental answer brief on this question, and if it does so that brief should be filed within 10 days of the appellant's service of its supplemental brief.

Seventh Circuit Opinion Regarding Personal Jurisdiction For Online Actions

In uBID, Inc. v. The GoDaddy Group, Inc., the Seventh Circuit released an interesting opinion relating to personal jurisdiction.  The court stated:

Plaintiff uBID, Inc. is a Chicago-based company that auctions the excess inventory of manufacturers and retailers over the Internet. It brought suit in Illinois against The GoDaddy Group, Inc., which operates the well-known domain name registration site GoDaddy.com. In its complaint, uBID alleged that GoDaddy violated the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), by intentionally registering domain names that are confusingly similar to uBID’s trademarks and domain names for the purpose of profiting from uBID’s marks and exploiting web surfers’ confusion by selling advertising for those confusingly similar websites. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that GoDaddy, which is headquartered in Arizona, lacked sufficient contacts with Illinois to be sued there. See uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 621 (N.D. Ill. 2009). We reverse. We conclude that due process is not violated when a defendant is called to account for the alleged consequences of its deliberate exploitation of the market in the forum state.

After a discussion of GoDaddy's contacts with Illinois and the law relating to personal jurisdiction, the court stated:

GoDaddy has thoroughly, deliberately, and successfully exploited the Illinois market. Its attempt to portray itself either as a local Arizona outfit or as a mindless collection of servers is unconvincing. This is a company that, like the national magazine in Keeton, has conducted extensive national advertising and made significant national sales. GoDaddy has aired many television advertisements on national networks, including six straight years of Super Bowl ads. It has engaged in extensive venue advertising and celebrity and sports sponsorships. All of this marketing has successfully reached Illinois consumers, who have flocked to GoDaddy by the hundreds of thousands and have sent many millions of dollars to the company each year. These contacts establish GoDaddy’s minimum contacts with the state for claims sufficiently related to those contacts.

GoDaddy seeks to distance itself from Illinois by casting the Illinois market as simply one among many, a place of no particular interest to it. Although its ads can be seen on Illinois television sets and computer screens and at Illinois sports venues, GoDaddy contends that these are only parts of a national advertising campaign and that it does not target its advertising toward Illinois residents in particular. Likewise, GoDaddy argues that its sales in Illinois are merely “the unilateral activity of Illinois residents” entered into “at the initiative of the customers,” and processed automatically by GoDaddy’s servers in Arizona. These characterizations of GoDaddy’s contacts with Illinois are inaccurate.

***

Mere minimum contacts, however, are not sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, it is essential not only that the defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state but also that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant “arise out of or relate to” those contacts......

The relationship between GoDaddy’s Illinois contacts and uBID’s claims is close enough to make the relatedness quid pro quo balanced and reasonable. GoDaddy has reached hundreds of thousands of people in Illinois with its advertising, which we know because it has made hundreds of thousands of sales in Illinois. How has GoDaddy advertised and made these sales? Based on the allegations in uBID’s complaint, it has done so “by offering ‘free parking’ of a registrant’s domain name.”

The text above is only a small portion of the Court's majority opinion.  Judge Manion wrote a concurring opinion that stated:

I agree with the court that personal jurisdiction in Illinois is proper.  I write separately because under the facts of this case, I would apply a more limited formula for connecting GoDaddy’s contacts in Illinois with uBID’s claim. In my view, personal jurisdiction in Illinois is proper for the simple reason that uBID is headquartered in Illinois, and that is where GoDaddy has directed, and uBID will be affected by, the harm at issue....The court’s formula for connecting GoDaddy’s contacts in Illinois with uBID’s claim is, in my view, unnecessarily broad.

Earlier this year, the Florida Supreme Court released an opinion relating to personal jurisdiction over a person  who made posts on a website.  That case was discussed at the following post: "Posting Statements On A Website Subjects A Person To Suit Under Florida's Long Arm Statute."

Dismissal Of Lawsuit Against Yahoo! For "Shameful" Links When Person Searched Name Affirmed

The Seventh Circuit released another opinion, today, relating to internet actions. In Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., the court's opinion began:

Like many, Beverly Stayart was curious about what she would find when she put her name into a search engine. In this case it was Yahoo. To her dismay, the comprehensive search results eventually contained links to websites and advertisements that she found shameful. She then sued Yahoo and the other defendants alleging trademark infringement and a host of state law claims. The district court dismissed her complaint, finding she lacked standing under the Lanham Act to sue for trademark infringement. She appeals, and because we agree that Stayart lacks standing under the Lanham Act, we affirm.

Repairs Must Be Made Prior To Recovery For Replacement Cost Coverage Claim In Florida

In Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. QBE Insurance Corporation (No. 09-13247), the Eleventh Circuit reversed the portions of the district court's 20 million dollar judgment relating to replacement cost coverage and ordinance and law and affirmed the actual cash value portions of the judgment.

After sustaining damage from Hurricane Wilma:

Buckley submitted its first Sworn Proof of Loss in April 2006. When QBE rejected the first claim due to various errors, Buckley Towers in June 2006 submitted a second Sworn Proof of Loss, consisting of a form that contained information applicable to both RCV damages and ACV damages. Buckley Towers designated the 'Full Cost of Repair or Replacement' as $5,187,388.03, the 'Applicable Depreciation' as $12,503.43, and the 'Actual Cash Value Loss' as $5,174,885.50. Buckley Towers designated the 'Net Amount Claimed' as $4,238,708.50. QBE never paid the claim, nor fully rejected it, construing it to be a demand for RCV damages and, therefore, not due until repairs were complete.

After determining that QBE was unlikely to pay its claim, Buckley Towers sued QBE in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, invoking its diversity jurisdiction and seeking ACV damages, RCV damages, law and ordinance damages, and a declaratory judgment. Buckley Towers conceded that it had not completed repairs before requesting damages and that repair was required under the contract before claiming RCV damages. Nevertheless, the trial court instructed the jury that QBE may be obliged to pay RCV damages if it found that QBE had prevented Buckley Towers’ performance under the RCV provision of the contract by denying ACV damages.  

After trial, the jury found that Buckley Towers had submitted a request for ACV damages and awarded the building $11,395,665 in ACV damages. Pursuant to the trial court’s prevention of performance instruction, the jury also awarded Buckley Towers $18,708,608 for RCV damages. The jury also awarded Buckley Towers $803,500,000 in law and ordinance damages per building.

With regard to the law and analysis, the court stated:

In the first place, the insurance contract unambiguously requires the insured to repair its property before receiving RCV damages. The insurance contract specifically provides that QBE “will not pay on a replacement cost basis for any loss or damage (1) Until the lost or damaged property is actually repaired or replaced; and (2) Unless the repairs or replacement are made as soon as reasonably possible after the loss or damage.”....Both parties agree, and the record undeniably establishes, that Buckley Towers never completed repairs and, thus, would be barred from recovering RCV damages under the plain terms of the contract.

***

Applying the doctrine of prevention of performance in this case would impermissibly rewrite the insurance contract on the equitable theory that it would be too costly for Buckley Towers to comply with the terms of the agreement. Under Florida’s binding law, however, courts are not free to rewrite the terms of an insurance contract and where a policy provision “is clear and unambiguous, it should be enforced according to its terms.”....Nor is it a defense to say that it would be costly for Buckley Towers to comply with the insurance contract as written. “Inconvenience or the cost of compliance [with contractual terms], though they might make compliance a hardship, cannot excuse a party from the performance of an absolute and unqualified undertaking to do a thing that is possible and lawful.”...Although Buckley Towers may be unable to receive the full range of benefits of their contract without an advance payment under Florida law, that cost and inconvenience may not relieve them of repairing the building prior to claiming RCV damages.....Indeed, the Florida courts have upheld similar contracts that expressly require repair before claiming RCV damages....Ceballo v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 967 So. 2d 811, 815 (Fla. 2007)...State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Patrick, 647 So. 2d 983, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)...Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Hamilton, -- So. 3d --, No. 1D09-4128, 2010 WL 2671808, *8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 7, 2010).

With regard to Ordinance and Law coverage, the court stated:

Having held that the doctrine of prevention of performance cannot excuse Buckley Towers from its obligation to repair to obtain RCV damages, it follows that Buckley Towers’ award of law and ordinance damages must also be reversed. Under the terms of the insurance contract, Buckley Towers is not entitled to law and ordinance damages unless “such damage results in enforcement of the ordinance or law.”...However, under Florida law and under the terms of the contract, Buckley Towers is not entitled to law and ordinance damages because it never repaired the property and never actually incurred increased damages due to the enforcement of laws or ordinances.

Finally, with regard to prejudgment interest the court held:

Under Florida law, “for the purpose of assessing prejudgment interest, a claim becomes liquidated and susceptible of prejudgment interest when a verdict has the effect of fixing damages as of a prior date.”...Not surprisingly, Florida law holds that prejudgment interest is governed by the terms of the insurance contract....This insurance contract provides that damages are only due [under two conditions]....Because neither of those conditions were satisfied until final judgment, Buckley Towers is not entitled to prejudgment interest under Florida law.

The court affirmed the district court's decision with regard to the application of actual cash value damages and the district court's decision relating to juror misconduct.

Time Stamp On Notice of Appeal Is Presumptive & Not Conclusive - Florida Supreme Court

In Strax Rejuvenation And Aesthetics Institute, Inc. (SC10-57), the Florida Supreme Court "quashed the decision in Strax Rejuvenation And Aesthetics Institute, Inc. v. Shield, 24 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), and approveed the decision in Weintraub v. Alter, 482 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)."  This issue, and Strax, was previously discussed on this blog at the following links:  Clerk's Date Stamp Is Dispositive Of Filing Date Regardless Of Contrary Evidence and Does The Stamp On The Notice Of Appeal Control Appellate Jurisdiction?

The facts were described as follows:

Strax filed its notice of nonfinal appeal from the trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. Because the clerk‟s time stamp indicated that the notice of appeal was filed August 21, 2009, which was one day late, the Fourth District issued an order to Strax to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. Strax responded to the show cause order and filed two affidavits, one from Strax's counsel and one from the owner of the courier service that delivered the notice to the courthouse for filing with the clerk of the circuit court. In the affidavit, Strax's counsel attests that on August 18, 2009, she placed the notice of appeal in her firm's “Broward County” filing box to be picked up by a courier service and filed in the Broward County courthouse on August 19, 2009. The owner of the courier service states in his affidavit that he picked up the notice of appeal from the law firm on August 19, 2009, and delivered it to the Broward County Clerk of Courts on that same day.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded, however, that pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(e), the clerk‟s time stamp “is dispositive on the issue of the date of filing a paper with the trial court.”

The Court concluded:

For many years the accepted view has been that filing is accomplished by simply placing the document in the hands of the proper officer. In 1941, we held that the filing of a pleading consists of simply placing it in the hands of the proper officer to be filed, and that the file marking is merely evidence of filing but is not essential to the validity of the document.

***

We conclude that the intent of rule 1.080(e), as amended in 1984, is to create a rebuttable presumption that the filing date is the date shown by the clerk's time stamp placed on the face of the document. Any other interpretation flies in the face of the stated intent for construction of the procedural rules.

***

While a bright-line rule that the clerk's stamp is dispositive of the filing date will certainly secure a speedy and inexpensive determination of the action, it will not necessarily secure a just determination.

***

Accordingly, we hold that Strax should be given an opportunity to prove that the notice of appeal was actually received by the clerk of the circuit court within the jurisdictional time frame applicable in this case.  Strax has not ultimately prevailed as the Court remanded the case to the "Fourth District Court of Appeal with directions that the district court remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the notice of appeal was timely filed, consistent with the holdings set forth above. At the evidentiary hearing, Strax must overcome the presumption that the clerk's time stamp accurately indicates the date of filing by submission of competent, substantial evidence that the notice of appeal was actually received in the clerk's office within the filing deadline."

Should Strax overcome the burden and establish the notice of appeal was timely filed, it will then be required to prosecute the actual merits of its appeal.

Finally, the Court noted:

By our decision today, we do not suggest that practitioners should be unconcerned about a clerk‟s time stamp that indicates late filing of a document—especially when that document is a notice of appeal. The occasions when counsel should be required to rebut the presumption of late filing by submission of evidence should be extremely rare. Counsel are thus encouraged to continue to be vigilant in assuring that their documents are both timely received in the clerk's office and, to the extent practicable, timely stamped to protect the rights of their clients.

The should also resolve the conflict certified in Ocr-EDS, Inc. v. S & S Enterprises, Inc., - So. 3d -, 2010 WL 838164 (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 12, 2010) and Soledispa v. La Salle Bank National Association (4D10-998).

Collateral Estoppel Precludes Trial Court From Deciding Issue Previously Decided By Arbitrators

In Bates v. The Betty & Ross Co. (3D09-2071), the Third District reversed an order terminating an arbitration. 

After the complaint was filed, the parties voluntarily entered into an arbitration agreement which required them to submit to arbitration “with respect to the allegations in the complaint.” The trial court then ordered the case to arbitration. Once the matter was in arbitration, Bates filed an Amended Claim alleging wrongful conduct on the part of Alec Ross, individually, and against the corporation for bad faith in providing incorrect payoff information for refinancing with regard to the loans. The civil theft allegations were dropped. The Betty & Ross Co. and Alec Ross moved the Arbitration Panel to terminate arbitration, arguing that Bates had breached the arbitration agreement by substituting a different set of allegations not encompassed by the original arbitration agreement that, they contend, are not subject to arbitration. The Arbitration Panel found a nexus between the new claims and those contained within the arbitration agreement and denied the motion to terminate arbitration without prejudice.  Unhappy with the Arbitration Panel’s decision, Alec Ross then moved in the Monroe County Circuit Court to terminate arbitration basically on the same grounds as previously argued before the Arbitration Panel. The trial judge granted the motion to terminate arbitration.

The Third District reversed, based upon two separate grounds.  Noting that "the scope of the agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration, not against it," the court first concluded that:

We construe the facts stated in the Amended Claim as having been alleged “with respect to” those allegations in the original complaint. The Amended Claim therefore comes within the scope and meaning of the arbitration clause.

The court then concluded "that the parties were collaterally estopped from even bringing this issue before the trial court."  The court stated:

The parties in this case were collaterally estopped from bringing the issue of whether termination was appropriate before the circuit court by first raising the issue before the Arbitration Panel and receiving a ruling from the panel. The essential elements of collateral estoppel, that the parties and issues are identical and that the particular matter was fully litigated and determined resulting in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, are present here. See Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 1995). Therefore, the determination made in the arbitration proceeding by the Arbitration Panel to deny the motion to terminate arbitration bars the trial court from hearing the motion to terminate arbitration under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Dadeland Depot, Inc., v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d at 1216.

Recordings Of Defendants Calls With Relatives Not Subject To Public Records Request

In Bent v. State (4D10-2726, 4D10-2727), granted petitions for certiorari filed by two defendants seeking to prevent the SunSentinel from obtaining recordings of conversations with their relatives.  The court described the facts as follows:

The newspaper sent a public records request to the Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO), asking for recordings of all the defendants’ phone conversations since their arrests, with the exception of calls made to their attorneys....Citing the definition of a public record in section 119.011(12), Florida Statutes, the court concluded that although BSO is not required to record the phone calls, it does so for legitimate security reasons and doing so makes the recordings a public record. The court concluded an exemption to the records request may apply if recordings include any confessions.

The court concluded:

We agree with petitioners that the audio recordings of the defendants’ phone calls are not public records subject to release....The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that “almost everything generated or received by a public agency” is a public record....“The determining factor is the nature of the record, not its physical location.”....As we have previously recognized, the purpose of the Public Records Act “is to open public records to allow Florida's citizens to discover the actions of their government.”

***

Here, the phone calls themselves are clearly not public records. The issue before us is whether BSO’s recording of the calls converts them to public records. Although monitoring of inmate calls for security purposes is related to official business of the jail, maintaining recordings of purely personal calls is not. The recordings at issue are personal phone calls, as opposed to records generated by BSO, such as mail logs or logs of phone numbers called....Unless the contents of the call involve a crime or security risk, “perpetuating” or maintaining these sound recordings has no connection to any official business of BSO.

Florida Bar 2010 Merit Retention Poll Results

A couple of weeks ago, the Florida Bar released the results from its poll of Florida Bar members asking whether  Florida's appellate judges should be retained.  The results can be viewed at the bottom of this email.  The Florida Bar's press release can be viewed HERE and the Florida Bar's biographical pamphlet page can be viewed HERE.  The Florida Times-Union has an article titled "Lawyers: No new justices needed" which can be viewed HERE.  The Florida Bar's website has the following:

Merit Retention

The Florida Bar polled its members about whether the Supreme Court justices and appeals court judges who will be on the November General Election ballot should be retained. The poll results, biographies of the judges and frequently asked questions about merit retention are now available. 

Florida Bar 2010 Merit Retention Poll Results