Supreme Court Order List

The Supreme Court order list reflecting order released today can be found here.

Justice Breyer Denies Massachusetts Stay Request In Habeas Case

On August 26, 2009, Justice Breyer, as Circuit Justict for the First Circuit, denied the Commonwealth of Massachusetts stay request.  The defendant was convicted, the intermediated appellate court reversed and the Supreme Judicial Court reinstated the conviction.  On a petition for habeas relief, the district court denied the petition but the First Circuit reversed and ordered the defendants immediate and unconditional release.  Justice Breyer refused to stay the release because he did not believe Massachusetts had established that the Court was likely to even take the case, let alone reverse it.  However, he did order additional bail requirements be imposed pending a decision by the Court as to whether to take the case.  The opinion in O'Brien v. O'Laughlin can be found here.

"Speculation On Justice Stevens"

There are very few legal blogs that have not linked to the AP story about the potential retirement of Justice Stevens.  That being said, the following is a post by Lyle Denniston at the SCOTUS Blog:

Speculation on Justice Stevens 

by Lyle Denniston

News outlets are filled this morning with speculative stories that Justice John Paul Stevens, having hired only one law clerk for the 2010 Term, is considering retirement after the 2009 Term. Some of those reports can be found here, here, here, here, and here. Thanks to Howard Bashman of How Appealing blog for several of these links.

The stories appeared to have been prompted mainly by a report by the Associated Press (the first link above), although there may have been other sources. Here is an excerpt from the AP’s report:

 “In response to a question from The Associated Press, Stevens confirmed through a court spokeswoman Tuesday that he has hired only one clerk for the term that begins in October 2010. He is among several justices who typically have hired all four clerks for the following year by now. Information about this advance hiring is not released by the court but is regularly published by some legal blogs. Stevens did not say whether he plans to hire his full allotment of clerks or whether he will leave the court at the conclusion of the term that begins next month. Retired justices are allowed to hire one clerk.”

Second District On The Economic Loss Rule and Waiver Of Right To Jury Trial

In Ladner v. AmSouth Bank (2D08-3540), the Second District reached a number of conclusions in a dispute relating to a mortgage. 

First, the trial court's decision relating to the sufficiency of the pleading was reversed. 

Second, the trial court's conclusion relating to the economic loss rule was reversed.  The court stated: "We do note though that the economic loss rule would not act as a bar to the Ladners' tort claims against AmSouth that stem from the Ladners' reliance on AmSouth's representations when entering into the construction contract with Water Color. " '[W]hen . . . fraud occurs in . . . connection with misrepresentations, statements, or omissions which cause the complaining party to enter into a transaction, then such fraud is fraud in the inducement and survives as an independent tort.' " Output, Inc. v. Danka Bus. Sys., Inc., 991 So. 2d 941, 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting D and M Jupiter, Inc. v. Friedopfer, 853 So. 2d 485, 487-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). " 'The economic loss rule has not eliminated causes of action based upon torts independent of the contractual breach. . . .' " Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 537 (Fla. 2004) (quoting HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996)). Accordingly, we also reverse the trial court's finding based on the economic loss rule as it applies to the Water Color contract.

Third, the Second District affirmed the trial court's application of the jury waiver clause in the mortgage agreement.

Directed Verdict Improper If Argued Prior To Plaintiff Resting Its Case

In Miami-Dade County Public Health Trust v. Acanda (3D07-3314), the Third District affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for directed verdict and related motions. [This is the second Jackson Memorial decision released this week by the Third District, the first was discussed here.]  Jackson Memoral appealed the entry of judgment relating to the "death of a premature infant."

After the testimony of the infant's father, counsel for the plaintiff stated:

“Your Honor, we are going to rest now and start with some procedural matters that we want to take up with the Court.” The court told the jury that “the plaintiff is getting close to resting or has rested.” The attorneys then went sidebar:

Mr. Gressman [hospital counsel]: Have they officially rested?

Ms. Tejedor [Plaintiff’s counsel]: No, No.

The Court: That was the oddest resting I’ve ever seen.

Ms. Tejedor [Plaintiff’s counsel]: We need to introduce a few records and stuff.

The trial court then excused the jury for the day and the handled procedural issues.

It was then that the Trust moved for a directed verdict. The Trust argued, among other grounds, that the Plaintiff “failed to serve process in conformity with Section 768.28(7), Fla. Stat. (1990)”, by neglecting to serve process on the Department of Financial Services.

The next morning, counsel for the Plaintiff had properly served the Department of Financial Services and proffered the proof of service to the court.  "Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff, finding the Trust 100% at fault. The court denied the Trust’s motion for new trial and motion for judgment in accordance with the motion for directed verdict and entered judgment for the Plaintiff."

The Third District first noted that "The cases are legion which find that a violation of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.480, 'occurs where a party moves for and obtains a directed verdict before the time that the party moved against has completed its case in chief'.”  Therefore, the motion argued by counsel for the hospital was likely premature since the plainitff had not yet rested.  However, even if the motion was not premature the court properly denied the motion for directed verdict since the issue relating to service of process was cured prior to the court's ruling.

Third District Affirms Trial Court's Dismissal For Fraud On The Court

In Williams v. Miami-Dade County Public Health Trust (3D07-2964), the Third District affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the plaintiff's "medical malpractice action in its entirety because, during the discovery process, Williams 'engaged in a clear and convincing scheme calculated to interfere with the trial court’s impartial ability to adjudicate [the] matter'.”  The court stated:

We review the trial court’s dismissal for fraud on the court for an abuse of discretion. Ramey v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 993 So. 2d 1014, 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Papadopoulos v. Cruise Ventures Three Corp., 974 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).  However, given the severity of the sanction of dismissal, this standard has been somewhat narrowed in application. See Ramey, 993 So. 2d at 1018 (noting that in reviewing a trial court’s dismissal for fraud on the court, appellate courts consider the heightened standard applicable to allegations of fraud, and the trial court’s discretionary decision to dismiss must be well-supported by the evidence).

In this case, the record amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that Williams’ repeated non-disclosures, false statements, and omissions were intentional and designed to interfere with the administration of justice. Therefore, the trial court’s order dismissing Williams’ complaint is affirmed in all respects.

Summary Judgment Should Be Granted To Employer Under Workers Compensation Statute In Personal Injury Suit Even When Employers Stops Paying Benefits

In Fly and Form, Inc. v. Marquez (3D09-43), the Third District reversed the trial court's order denying Fly and Form's motion for summary judgment in a personal injury lawsuit.  The court held:

Fly and Form moved for summary judgment based on the exclusivity of workers’ compensation benefits and its immunity from suit as Marquez’s employer. We conclude that the trial court erred when it denied Fly & Form’s motion for summary judgment. Fly & Form was not estopped from asserting the exclusivity defense of the workers’ compensation statute, even though it had denied Marquez further workers’ compensation benefits. See Coca-Cola Enters., Inc. v. Montiel, 985 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that Coca-Cola was not entitled to the exclusivity defense of the workers’ compensation statute because the employer had denied the employee workers’ compensation benefits). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment and remand for entry of summary judgment in Fly and Form’s favor.

Municipality Acting In Proprietary Capacity Is Governed By The Same Laws As Private Corporation

In DeFalco et al v. City of Hallandale Beach (4D08-3385), the Fourth District affirmed the trial court and held:

“When a municipality operates in its proprietary capacity, it is governed by the same laws and may exercise the same rights as a private corporation engaged in a similar undertaking.” City of Winter Park v. Montesi, 448 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (citing Hamler v. City of Jacksonville, 122 So. 220 (Fla. 1929)). The City, by purchasing the property, placed itself in the position of a mobile home park owner b y definition under chapter 723.  Appellants argue that “[t]he constitutional right to equal protection mandates that similarly situated persons be treated alike.” Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC v. Jacobs, 841 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 2003). The mobile home owners have been treated the same under the law as they would have by any private mobile home park owner. The City, as the mobile home park owner, has been treated the same under the law as any private mobile home park owner. Their rights to equal protection have not been violated.

Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski Stays Mandate In Baseball Steroid Results Appeal

Previously, I discussed the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision concluding the federal government improperly seized the steroid test results of Major League Baseball Players.  That post can be found here.  Today, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski stayed the court's mandate until the government decides whether to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.  An AP article about the stay can be found here,  an article on MLB.com here,  and Newsday here.