Update: On November 30, 2011, the opinion discussed below was withdrawn and an en banc opinion released in its place. The en banc opinion is discussed HERE.
In Alvarez v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (4D08-3498), the Fourth District reversed the trial court's judgment entered after a jury verdict and remanded for a new trial because the plaintiff was not allowed to conduct sufficient discovery. The opinion began:
In Alvarez v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (4D08-3498), the Fourth District reversed the trial court's judgment entered after a jury verdict and remanded for a new trial because the plaintiff was not allowed to conduct sufficient discovery. The opinion began:
Relevant evidence in civil cases — that is, the acceptable knowledge base of facts for the jury — is found in an aggregate of historical facts, data, information, objects and opinions that the law allows the parties to place before the finder-of-fact to decide the case. To assist the parties in assembling all the knowledge fairly needed to prove a cause of action or defense, the rules establish a pretrial process called discovery, which (as its name implies) is also meant to afford a means of apprehending that which they do not know. Hence, the process begins with a wide sweep, gathering many kinds of knowledge only possibly germane (if at all), yet capable of leading to admissible trial evidence. At discovery’s end, the accumulated knowledge is distilled into the evidence the parties can lay before the jury.
When this discovery is not allowed to have its intended scope — for example, when one party is blocked from ascertaining and acquiring from the other party unprotected, relevant information and data that is admissible at trial — the sum of knowledge placed before the jury will be unfairly deficient, hence misleading. The whole structure of the trial will be faulty. The jury’s basis for resolving the facts will be tilted against the party denied that access. Trial then will be an expedition on an errant course. Because the possible factual base for the jury has been unreasonably curtailed peremptorily, a jury’s resolution of the facts will be unreliable, and its verdict untrustworthy.
The opinion provided a detailed account of the specific facts at issue and why it was error to refuse the plaintiff the opportunity to conduct the discovery. The opinion concluded:
As we saw in the beginning, the apparatus of civil litigation has incorporated into its structure the right of all parties to discovery of facts, information and data involving the subject matter of the dispute. Denying one of the parties that discovery — especially as to essential evidence critical to proving a claim or defeating a defense — is a manifest injustice. Within the meaning of the harmless error law, the denial here was considerably prejudicial and perpetrated a substantial injustice on the plaintiff in this litigation.
Upon remand, discovery will have to resume, governed by the holdings of this opinion. Proper and full discovery will then require a new trial, at which both sides will have the right to lay all their relevant, admissible evidence before the jury.
The court's entire opinion is below:
Alvarez v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (4D08-3498)
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